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 Check the Invitation: The Trouble with 
Appeals Invited by Supreme Court Justices 
Michael Gentithes* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court sits atop the nation’s adversarial system of law, 
one premised upon the idea that the most just results will be achieved through 
party presentation of the issues in the crucible of the litigation process.1  But 
litigation in the Court increasingly fails to reflect the ideals of procedural jus-
tice embedded in that system.  Parties and their attorneys play an ever-dimin-
ishing role in actually shaping the direction of the law in the nation’s highest 
court.2  Instead, modern Supreme Court Justices exercise top-down control of 
the direction of new doctrine to the exclusion of the parties themselves.  While 
the demands of their discretionary docket have decreased, Justices have vastly 
increased the length and originality of their opinions; their written work is both 
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showitz, Mary Ann Becker, Geoffrey Burkhart, Hayes Holderness, Jonathan Brown, 
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the members of Chicago-Kent College of Law’s Visiting Assistant Professor commit-
tee. 
1.  The value of procedural justice rests upon 
 
the assumption that a good process is the best way to achieve good and fair 
results.  If all of the procedural standards are met, everything should have been 
done correctly, and that affords the best possibility of getting to the truth, and 
ultimately to the best “correct” answer.  A judge who interferes with the process 
by stepping out of the role of umpire and into the role of adversarial participant 
by becoming involved in the fashioning of arguments may risk upsetting the 
process and producing bad results. 
 
Sarah M. R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 269 (2004); 
see also STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 95 (2000) (“No one is expected to 
believe that [the court’s] decisions are infallibly just in matters of substance; but eve-
rybody is expected to believe that at least its procedures are just because they conform 
to the basic principle governing adversary reasoning: that both sides should be equally 
heard.”). 
 2. This trend might be especially alarming for those litigants who obtain repre-
sentation from the small cadre of talented practitioners who are often paid thousands of 
dollars an hour for their alleged abilities to persuade the Justices of our nation’s highest 
court.  See Casey C. Sullivan, How Much Do Top Supreme Court Lawyers Make? An 




Gentithes: Check the Invitation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
340 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
longer and contains less borrowed language from the parties’ briefs than ever 
before.3  At the same time, oral arguments are no longer a genuine opportunity 
for the parties to be heard.  They instead resemble a cocktail party amongst the 
Justices, where the attorney at the lectern is little more than a straight man in 
the Justice’s repartee over the appropriate direction for the law’s next evolu-
tion.4 
 
 3. The Court today hears well under 100 merits cases per Term.  See Barry Sul-
livan & Megan Canty, Interruptions in Search of a Purpose: Oral Argument in the 
Supreme Court, October Terms 1958–60 and 2010–12, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1005, 1006 
n.5 (citing David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks 
in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 950 (2007) (reviewing TODD C. 
PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) AND ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, 
SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s plenary docket has plunged over the 
last two decades, from 153 signed opinions in 1986 to a comparably paltry seventy-
four signed opinions in 2002 and 2003.” (footnote omitted))).  The Court’s output has 
remained at about that level.  See 2014 Term Opinions of the Court, SUP. CT. U.S., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/14 [http://perma.cc/GVY5-4DRU] 
(last updated June 18, 2015).  As recently as the 1980s, the Supreme Court’s caseload 
was generally regarded as overwhelming.  See, e.g., David M. O’Brien, Managing the 
Business of the Supreme Court, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 667, 667 (1985) (“All of the 
justices now agree that they are overworked by deciding too many cases.”); see also 
Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William 
Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1366–76 (2006).  Nonetheless, it has increased 
the median length of its opinions from approximately 2000 words in the late 1950s to 
over 8200 by 2009.  See Sullivan & Canty, supra, at 1007 n.11 (citing Ryan C. Black 
& James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court 
Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 630, 634–35 (2008)).  See also Adam Liptak, Justices 
Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html. 
  This increase in opinion length has been attended by a corresponding increase 
in analytical originality that looks beyond the text of merits briefs to find the Justices’ 
own preferred analyses and language.  See Black & Spriggs, supra, at 652.  Since 1946, 
there has been “a clear decrease in the maximum values of language overlap per jus-
tice[,] . . . potentially indicating that the Court’s shrinking docket led to less reliance on 
the merits briefs.”  Adam Feldman, A Brief Assessment of Supreme Court Opinion Lan-
guage, 1946–2013, 86 MISS. L.J. 105, 137 (2017). 
 4. In a comparison of oral arguments in the 1958–1960 Terms and the 2010–2012 
Terms, Barry Sullivan and Megan Canty revealed the myriad ways in which Justices 
have come to dominate the direction of oral argument over the last half-century.  See 
Sullivan & Canty, supra note 3, at 1042.  The differences in oral argument between 
those eras 
 
include an increase in the average number of words spoken by the Justices in 
the later cases; a substantial increase in the percentage of words spoken by the 
Justices (compared with the percentage of words spoken by counsel) in the later 
cases; a higher average ratio of Justice statements to questions in the later cases; 
an almost doubling of the average number of words the Justices spoke during 
2
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A microcosm of the trend of top-down lawmaking in the Supreme Court 
can be seen in the way Justices frequently reach beyond the immediate dispute 
to invite appeals on related topics that they believe future litigants ought to 
raise.  The line of cases concerning the constitutionality of capital punishment 
demonstrates this trend.  As this Article details, invited appeals often come in 
the form of what I call soft invitations.  Simply phrased, those are open ques-
tions to the bar that a Justice thinks future litigants should answer, such as Jus-
tice Golderg’s dissent in Rudolph v. Alabama inviting briefing on three specific 
questions related to the constitutionality of capital punishment.5  Increasingly, 
invited appeals perniciously offer detailed analytical answers to their own 
questions in what I call opinion-briefs.  One example of this phenomenon is 
Justice Breyer’s detailed forty-four-page dissent in Glossip v. Gross explaining 
the four specific arguments he would find persuasive for ruling the death pen-
alty unconstitutional, including reams of social science data and dense string 
cites.6  Such opinion-briefs are more akin to persuasive advocacy than neutral 
resolution of a legal dispute; they reach issues the parties never raised in great 
detail nor with great conviction.  This Article critiques opinion-briefs, used by 
both liberal and conservative Justices to transparently ghostwrite their favored 
reasoning in a long-standing doctrinal debate,7 for two reasons. 
 
each separate speaking turn; and a dramatic shortening of the longest opening 
and non-opening monologues by counsel in the later cases. 
 
Id. 
 5. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889–91 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
 6. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Breyer 
himself claims that his method in Glossip was inspired by Goldberg, for whom he was 
clerking at the time Goldberg wrote his Rudolph dissent.  Adam Liptak, Death Penalty 




Liptak, Death Penalty Foes] (“Justice Breyer has told friends that his dissent was partly 
inspired by a similar one a half-century before.  The earlier dissent, by Justice Arthur 
J. Goldberg, helped create the modern movement for the abolition of the death penalty 
and led to a four-year moratorium on executions.”). 
 7. As the Article describes in greater depth below, Breyer’s detailed invitation 
for a future appeal follows a dangerous trend that has appeared in liberal and conserva-
tive jurisprudence alike.  For instance, before the incessantly criticized and even presi-
dentially discredited decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010), Justice Scalia set the table for advocates to argue that corporate polit-
ical donations should be unlimited in his concurrence in Federal Election Commission 
v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449 (2007).  See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, 
Citizens United and Its Critics, 120 YALE L. J. ONLINE 77, 80–84 (2010), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/citizens-united-and-its-critics (collecting critiques in 
the immediate aftermath of the decision); Ashley Alman, Barack Obama: “The Citi-
zens United Decision Was Wrong,” HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2015, 2:22 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/21/barack-obama-citizens-
3
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First, the frequent use of opinion-briefs expands the rift between our legal 
system’s faith in adversary procedure and the actual process of litigation in our 
nation’s highest court.  Adversarial litigation is our legal way of life, one re-
flected in the structure of our legal system from top to bottom.8  This Article 
begins by describing the Court’s departure from traditional adversarial litiga-
tion that is driven in part by Justices’ frequent use of opinion-briefs.  The Ar-
ticle then normatively analyzes that departure from the adversarial ideal.  
Though opinion-briefs and a top-down style of jurisprudence might seem at-
tractive for a Court that has become the primary policymaking body in our 
federal government, this Article suggests that, at first blush, opinion-briefs are 
undesirable.  Significant theoretical justifications for opinion-briefs and other 
forms of top-down decision-making would be necessary to overcome the insti-
tutional threats within them that this Article identifies. 
Second, opinion-briefs are troubling given their tendency to undermine 
many traditional notions of appellate jurisprudence.  The author of an opinion-
brief appears far from neutral, suggesting that both she and perhaps the Court 
as a whole have decided in advance an issue that the parties have not yet raised 
and argued.  Opinion-briefs likewise disregard any sense of judicial humility; 
the opinion-brief’s author intimates that only she can divine the best legal ar-
guments in support of a particular position, belittling any creative solutions that 
the bar might muster.  Opinion-briefs frequently call for trimming or reversing 
longstanding bodies of precedent, offending notions of stare decisis inherent 
 
united_n_6517520.html (noting President Obama’s ongoing disagreement with the de-
cision).  The pattern can also be seen in recent litigation regarding the constitutionality 
of public employee union dues, a topic the Court recently addressed for the third time 
in the last decade.  See generally Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 
(mem.).  See also Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (recent litigation concerning whether Amtrak constitutes a gov-
ernmental entity). 
  It is noteworthy that the WRTL II decision contains a prime example of a soft 
invitation in Justice Alito’s concurrence.  See WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 482–83 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“If it turns out that the implementation of the as-applied standard set out 
in the principal opinion impermissibly chills political speech, we will presumably be 
asked in a future case to reconsider the holding in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Comm’n, that § 203 is facially constitutional.” (citations omitted)).  Such soft invita-
tions “may signal to a litigant that now is a good time to ask for the overturning of 
precedent” and “make it more likely for a Justice to shape the Court’s docket.”  Richard 
L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and Inadvertence: How 
Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779, 796 (2012). 
 8. Supreme Court Justices “are to be sure extremely able, but they generally need 
effective, skilled advocates in order to reach well-considered, thoughtful rulings.  Ab-
sent such external input, the chambers simply do not have the resources to craft signif-
icant rulings with the necessary awareness of their likely implications.”  Richard J. 
Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the 
Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1542 (2008) (footnote omitted). 
4
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in appellate judging.9  Additionally, opinion-briefs tempt the Justices to misal-
locate their limited resources by wading into the morass of policy debates with 
resolutions likely to be driven by massive social science research efforts.10 
This Article proceeds in four Parts.  First, it categorizes invited appeals 
into the two species discussed above, soft invitations and opinion-briefs, 
providing a growing catalogue of the latter.  In the next two Parts, the Article 
normatively analyzes those invited appeals, concluding that, while soft invita-
tions have many laudable qualities, opinion-briefs are extremely troubling.  
Lastly, the Article offers specific advice for practitioners who encounter opin-
ion-briefs, like death penalty abolitionists determining their next move in the 
wake of Breyer’s Glossip opinion, arguing that they should not accept the au-
thoring Justice’s invitation.11  Patience is more prudent than accepting an opin-
ion-brief’s request for specific arguments. 
II.  CATEGORIZING INVITED APPEALS 
Concurring and dissenting Justices often describe not only the outcome 
they believe to be correct, but also the repercussions that ought to flow from 
that outcome or the questions that remain open in light of that ruling.  Though 
perhaps unnecessary, expansive obiter dicta is an accepted part of the judicial 
process, a sign of inquisitive and forthright jurists considering all relevant fac-
tors while seeking the legally correct outcome.  This Article’s focus, however, 
is not those relatively innocuous and meandering judicial musings.  Instead, I 
focus on what I call invited appeals, which I further subdivide into two species: 
(1) soft invitations and (2) opinion-briefs. 
 
 9. As I have discussed in detail elsewhere, the question of whether the Supreme 
Court has any consistent, guiding principles of stare decisis remains open.  See gener-
ally Michael Gentithes, In Defense of Stare Decisis, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 799 
(2009) [hereinafter Gentithes, In Defense]; Michael Gentithes, Precedent, Humility, 
and Justice, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 835 (2012) [hereinafter Gentithes, Precedent].  
Though resolving that question is beyond the scope of this Article, it is nonetheless 
notable that invited appeals often call to cut back on existing precedent to some degree.  
As I will argue below, such reversals of long-standing precedent often have negative 
normative repercussions. 
 10. Given these normative drawbacks, this Article ultimately suggests that advo-
cates of the positions taken by the author of an opinion-brief – such as death penalty 
abolitionists reading Breyer’s Glossip dissent – should not accept those invitations.  See 
infra Part VI. 
 11. As I argue below, in the time since Breyer issued his opinion, abolitionists 
have expressed confused and contradictory views on the prudence of directly challeng-
ing the death penalty’s constitutionality at a time when there is a slowly building 
groundswell against capital punishment at the state level.  Liptak, Death Penalty Foes, 
supra note 6.  Given the uncertainty that Breyer’s arguments will persuade his col-
leagues to directly hold capital punishment unconstitutional, abolitionists would be bet-
ter served by continuing to work to undermine the death penalty on a more local level, 
allowing the movement against capital punishment to continue to grow organically un-
til a clearer tipping point has been reached.  Id. 
5
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A.  Soft Invitations 
When Justice Goldberg became interested in the constitutionality of cap-
ital punishment in the early 1960s, he circulated an open memo to his fellow 
Justices asking whether the Court “should now request argument and explicitly 
consider this constantly recurring issue.”12  Though rebuffed by his colleagues, 
who did not agree that an invitation for argument on that ultimate question was 
appropriate, Goldberg decided to issue a generalized invitation for future liti-
gants to answer questions about the death penalty’s constitutionality.13  Gold-
berg’s dissent in Rudolph is a prime example of a soft invitation for an appeal.14  
Without thoroughly researching or prejudging an issue that had not received 
adequate attention from the Court, Goldberg simply posed three open questions 
to the bar.  First, he asked whether the punishment of death for the crime of 
rape violated the Eighth Amendment; second, whether the taking of a life for a 
crime other than murder was impermissibly disproportionate to the offense; 
and third, whether the permissible aims of punishment, such as deterrence, iso-
lation, and rehabilitation, might be served by penalties less severe than death.15 
An opinion such as Goldberg’s is a form of judicial advocacy, and it cer-
tainly constitutes judging with an eye toward controversies beyond the imme-
diate case.  However, it is not reminiscent of express advocacy by the party to 
that future appeal.  These soft invitations do not suggest how the author is lean-
ing in answering the questions posed (at least not explicitly), and they do not 
provide a roadmap for the future litigants to follow in order to succeed on one 
side of that question.  They are inquiries offered without an answer, genuine 
requests for deeper consideration. 
A more modern example of a soft invitation can be found in Justice 
Alito’s concurring opinion in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right 
to Life, Inc. (WRTL II),16 which preceded the Court’s incessantly criticized, and 
even presidentially discredited, decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission.17  In WRTL II, Alito used a single-paragraph concurrence to indi-
cate the possibility that the Court would address the constitutionality of 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission18 in a future case, without setting 
out the arguments or the likely outcome: “If it turns out that the implementation 
of the as-applied standard set out in the principal opinion impermissibly chills 
political speech, we will presumably be asked in a future case to reconsider the 
 
 12. Arthur J. Goldberg, Commentary: Death and the Supreme Court, 15 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 1, 1 (1987). 
 13. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889–91 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
 14. The defendant in Rudolph filed a petition for certiorari after he was convicted 
of rape and sentenced to the death penalty.  Rudolph v. State, 275 Ala. 115, 116 (Ala. 
1963). 
 15. Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 889–91 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
 16. 551 U.S. 449, 482 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 17. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  For examples of the ongoing critical backlash against 
Citizens United, see Abrams, supra note 7; Alman, supra note 7. 
 18. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
6
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holding in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, that § 203 is facially con-
stitutional.”19  That kind of generalized invitation may have come with a hint 
of foreshadowing toward Alito’s eventual opinion on the topic, but it was at 
least phrased as an opportunity for advocates on both sides of the question of 
McConnell’s holding to make their cases.  Even commentators who favor cam-
paign finance reform have noted that Alito’s opinion merely “signal[s] to a 
litigant that now is a good time to ask for the overturning of precedent,” rather 
than dictating exactly how and why that precedent should be discarded.20  
Prima facie, soft invitations are nothing more than genuine requests for further 
investigation by those litigants most interested in the topic highlighted by the 
opinion.21 
B.  Opinion-Briefs 
Standing in contrast to his former mentor’s soft invitation in Rudolph is 
Justice Breyer’s recent dissenting opinion in Glossip.  There, Justice Breyer 
began by similarly posing several topics for discussion: whether capital pun-
ishment had become seriously unreliable, whether its application was too arbi-
trary, whether the delays in carrying out that punishment were unconscionable, 
and whether the tide of public opinion was turning against such penalties.22  
But Breyer was not satisfied with simply posing those questions and awaiting 
a litigant’s response.  Instead, Breyer sought to send a message to death penalty 
abolitionists about what he saw as the most convincing arguments on each of 
those topics. 
The result is a forty-four-page opinion that reads more like advocacy than 
neutral resolution of a pressing legal question.  The odor of prejudgment is 
strong; none could doubt either Justice Breyer’s position regarding the consti-
tutionality of capital punishment or his specific reasoning behind that position.  
Though judicial transparency is a laudable goal, Breyer’s opinion provides it 
only regarding himself; he leaves advocates with uncertain guidance as to how 
persuasive, if at all, the entirety of his reasoning might be to the rest of the 
 
 19. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 482–83 (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 20. Hasen, supra note 7, at 796. 
 21. One borderline example of a “soft invitation,” though it comes with the caveat 
that the author was plainly offering facetious criticism of the majority opinion, is Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.  See 556 U.S. 868, 890 
(2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Roberts famously offered no fewer than forty “fun-
damental questions” that were raised by the majority’s “probability of bias” standard 
for determining when judicial recusal is necessary.  Id. at 893–98.  Roberts’s questions 
were open-ended but also written to illustrate “only a few uncertainties” that were cre-
ated by the majority, rather than to seek genuine input from future litigants in fleshing 
out the “probability of bias” standard.  Id. at 898.  Roberts did not seek answers to those 
questions; he sought to prevent them from ever requiring answers by undermining the 
new test the majority had proposed. 
 22. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–56 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
7
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bench.23  The faux-transparency runs deeper, perhaps, because there is nothing 
in the conventional understanding of stare decisis that requires even Breyer 
himself to adhere to his expansive thinking in a dissent in any future majority 
opinion.  This is especially true given the horse-trading Breyer would likely 
need to engage in to persuade a majority of his colleagues to join him in de-
claring the death penalty unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. 
One might wonder why a death penalty opponent would second-guess the 
normative value of such an openly friendly opinion on the Court.  The answer 
comes from a long-term strategic perspective.  As I will argue in more detail 
below, if such opinion-briefs become an accepted high court practice, they will 
surely be utilized by Justices on all sides of important constitutional debates, 
some of which might not so neatly align with the goals of criminal justice re-
form or other aspects of the abolitionist bar’s legal agenda.  In fact, other Jus-
tices have already written opinion-briefs addressing a number of other issues 
spanning the political gamut. 
One example comes from Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in WRTL 
II.24  Scalia composed that opinion just three years before the Court’s Citizens 
United ruling, setting out the precise arguments he hoped would be made by 
conservative members of the bar in a future appeal.25  He began by explaining 
his position that restrictions on any corporate spending were unconstitutional, 
and thus McConnell v. Federal Election Commission26 and Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce27 should be overruled.28  Using a method that would 
later be reflected in Justice Breyer’s Glossip dissent, Scalia first discussed his 
understanding of the history of campaign finance law beginning with Buckley 
v. Valeo, which had long given political speech in the form of campaign dona-
tions extensive First Amendment protection.29  He then argued that Austin and 
McConnell came to improperly restrict those donations where the donor was a 
corporate entity, a distinction without basis in precedent or the Constitution.30  
 
 23. Though Breyer also arguably provided some transparency for the views of 
Justice Ginsburg, who joined his opinion, that transparency is limited.  Ginsburg has in 
no way committed herself to the precise analysis Breyer presented in future cases and 
is far less restrained by that dissent than she would be by a majority opinion to which 
she had joined. 
 24. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 483–504 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 25. Scalia was one of “[t]hree other Justices [who] concurred in the judgment to 
express their desire to overturn McConnell and Austin” in WRTL II.  Richard M. Re, 
Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1904 (2014). 
 26. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 876 (2010). 
 27. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 876. 
 28. Hasen, supra note 7, at 785. 
 29. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 483–504 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 30. Id. at 485–91.  Scalia claimed that all tests for the “functional equivalent of 
express advocacy” will be unconstitutionally vague chills upon speech, and thus that 
the entire approach in McConnell should be discarded in favor of a ruling that all cor-
porations have the same speech rights as other citizens.  Id. at 492–500.  Ultimately, 
8
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Scalia then analyzed the application of the Court’s stare decisis doctrine to the 
Austin and McConnell opinions, concluding that they were ripe for overrul-
ing.31  Finally, Scalia invited future litigants to directly argue that those Su-
preme Court precedents should be overruled, an effort that would bear fruit in 
Citizens United.32 
Justice Scalia did not hesitate to use similar tactics in cases prizing reform 
of the criminal justice system.  His dissents in James v. United States33 and 
Sykes v. United States,34 which set the table for the Court to declare the residual 
clause of the Armed Career Criminals Act (“ACCA”) unconstitutionally vague 
in Johnson v. United States,35 are prime examples.  In James, Scalia considered 
a clause of the ACCA that imposed a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sen-
tence for federal firearms offenders with three prior convictions for “violent 
felonies” that are in part defined by an ambiguous residual clause.36  Scalia 
held that this clause would force the Court to either conceive a “coherent way 
of interpreting the statute so that it applies in a relatively predictable and ad-
ministrable fashion to a smaller subset of crimes” or “recognize the statute for 
the drafting failure it is and hold it void for vagueness.”37  For the time being, 
he left that choice open-ended, giving future litigants some wiggle room.38  
However, Scalia grew impatient with the briefing that did not seek to declare 
the ACCA void for vagueness in Sykes.  There, Scalia pressed the Court to 
“admit that the ACCA’s residual provision [defining a ‘violent felony’] is a 
drafting failure and declare it void for vagueness,”39 overruling a series of prior 
cases, including James.  Citing to his own James dissent, Scalia predicted that 
the Court would soon be mired in an “endless” series of “ad hoc application[s] 
of ACCA to the vast variety of state criminal offenses.”40  He then outlined the 
argument he believed was most persuasive for holding the ACCA’s residual 
clause void for vagueness, explaining how neither the Court’s current test nor 
any others that might be proposed could provide the constitutionally required 
clarity.41  On those grounds, Scalia would write a majority opinion in Johnson 
just four years later, holding the residual clause unconstitutional.42 
 
Scalia expressed his already-made decision that he would overrule McConnell and only 
joined in the majority’s result.  Id. at 504. 
 31. Id. at 500–03. 
 32. Id. at 503–04. 
 33. 550 U.S. 192, 214 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 34. 564 U.S. 1, 28 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 
2551. 
 35. 135 S. Ct. 2551. 
 36. 18 U.S.C.A § 924(e)(2)(B) (West 2017). 
 37. James, 550 U.S. at 229–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 38. Id. at 230. 
 39. Sykes, 564 U.S. at 28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 33. 
 41. Id. at 34–35. 
 42. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2256–60 (2015). 
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It is noteworthy that the parties in Johnson initially failed to answer 
Scalia’s invitation to argue that the ACCA’s residual clause was void for 
vagueness; it was not until the Court, likely at Scalia’s urging, ordered reargu-
ment on that very question that the parties first broached the topic.43  Thus, 
Scalia was not willing to wait for his opinion-briefs in James and Sykes to take 
root.  He forced the parties to present the issue before they were even willing 
to answer his invitation, taking the opportunity to forge new doctrine of the 
very sort he suggested in those opinion-briefs.  Though this may have been an 
outcome lauded by criminal justice supporters, the means to that end may have 
opened the door to similarly spectacular outcomes for those with a different 
political agenda. 
One such issue recently treated in a judicial opinion-brief is the constitu-
tionality of public union dues, a topic being addressed once again this Term.  
In Knox, Justice Alito issued a none-too-subtle challenge to the constitutional-
ity of such dues.44  Alito expressly criticized the opt-out approach to public 
union employees’ dues, suggesting that in prior cases, 
[The Court] did not pause to consider the broader constitutional impli-
cations of an affirmative opt-out requirement.  Nor did [it] explore the 
extent of First Amendment protection for employees who might not 
qualify as active “dissenters” but who would nonetheless prefer to keep 
their own money rather than subsidizing by default the political agenda 
of a State-favored union.45 
He went on to expressly criticize standing precedent on the topic, strongly hint-
ing that the views in prior decisions such as Abood and Hudson “approach, if 
they do not cross, the limit of what the First Amendment can tolerate.”46  Alito 
all but begged like-minded attorneys to argue that those prior decisions are un-
constitutional: 
[B]y allowing unions to collect any fees from nonmembers and by per-
mitting unions to use opt-out rather than opt-in schemes when annual 
dues are billed, our cases have substantially impinged upon the First 
Amendment rights of nonmembers.  In the new situation presented here, 
we see no justification for any further impingement.47 
 
 43. See Rory Little, (Re-)Argument Preview: Is Possession of a Sawed-Off Shot-
gun a “Violent Felony”? The Government Is Not Going Down Without a Fight, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 17, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/re-ar-
gument-preview-is-possession-of-a-sawed-off-shotgun-a-violent-felony-the-govern-
ment-is-not-going-down-without-a-fight/. 
 44. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (2012). 
 45. Id. at 2290. 
 46. Id. at 2291. 
 47. Id. at 2295. 
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Though the parties in Harris v. Quinn48 obliged Alito by debating the on-
going salience of Abood,49 his 2013 decision in that case did not explicitly 
overrule it.  Instead, it provided greater refinement of the rationale he believed 
supported such a move.  After recapping his questioning of Abood in Knox, 
Alito turned to an “examin[ation of] the path that led to this Court’s decision 
in Abood.”50  Alito then articulated his doubts about the Hanson decision, 
which “dismissed the objecting employees’ First Amendment argument with a 
single sentence.”51  Next, Alito casted doubt on Street, which followed Han-
son’s reasoning, before directly criticizing Abood’s analysis of public-sector 
collective-bargaining agreements.52  At his argumentative zenith, Alito specif-
ically criticized Abood for assuming that compulsory payments to public sector 
unions were constitutional under Hanson and Street, noting his belief that 
wages and pensions for public employees are inherently political issues and 
highlighting the practical administrative difficulties in determining what a pub-
lic sector union spends on political activity.53  But despite spending twelve 
pages dissecting the flaws in Abood, Alito ultimately resolved the question be-
fore him on the grounds that the specific employees at issue in the case did not 
qualify as “full-fledged public employees.”54  Alito thus made plain that he 
believed Abood should be overruled given the First Amendment concerns he 
highlighted, leaving his dissection of that opinion as a roadmap for future brief 
writers squarely addressing the question in a later appeal.  As will be discussed 
in more detail below, the unresolved constitutional status of public employee 
union dues demonstrates how an opinion-brief’s author might be unable to later 
deliver a majority supporting her position due to a variety of unforeseeable 
influences.55 
Harris v. Quinn was not the last time Alito wrote the brief for future liti-
gants in forthcoming constitutional cases.  In recent litigation that considered 
whether Amtrak constitutes a governmental entity for purposes of determining 
the validity of the “metrics and standards” it issues on the performance and 
scheduling of passenger railroad services, Alito issued a similar opinion-
brief.56  Though Alito concurred that Amtrak was a governmental entity, he 
added a twelve-page opinion that equaled the length of Justice Kennedy’s ma-
jority ruling.57  Alito provided complex arguments suggesting that there were 
 
 48. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). 
 49. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Is Abood in Trouble?, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Jan. 18, 2014, 12:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/01/argument-preview-is-
abood-in-trouble/. 
 50. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627. 
 51. Id. at 2629. 
 52. Id. at 2627–30. 
 53. Id. at 2632–33. 
 54. Id. at 2634–41. 
 55. See infra Part IV. 
 56. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1238 (2015) 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 57. See generally id. 
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further constitutional infirmities created by that classification of Amtrak.58  He 
first noted that Amtrak’s board members must take an oath to support the Con-
stitution and receive a commission,59 then observed that the arbitration provi-
sion of one of Amtrak’s authorizing statutes violates the private non-delegation 
doctrine in contravention of separation of powers principles,60 and finally sug-
gested that the president of Amtrak must be appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate.61  None of those rulings controlled the outcome of 
the case; they were instead detailed suggestions of how future litigants ought 
to argue against the constitutionality of various portions of Amtrak’s authoriz-
ing statutes. 
A final example drawn from Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Di-
rect Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl62 demonstrates that opinion-briefs are gaining 
traction even amongst the Justices at the Court’s ideological center.  In that 
case, the Court held that a consortium of online retailers could sue to enjoin 
Colorado from imposing notice and reporting requirements for sales to Colo-
rado customers.63  What the retailers sought to enjoin was a Colorado statute 
designed to work around negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence that re-
quired a retailer to have some physical presence in the State before the State 
could collect use and sales taxes from that retailer.64  Though the Court’s opin-
ion had Kennedy’s “unqualified join and assent,” he wrote separately to raise 
an issue the parties never broached in their briefs – whether to overturn the 
underlying negative Commerce Clause precedents that caused Colorado to cre-
ate the reporting requirements.65 
Though Kennedy acknowledged that Brohl itself was not an “appropri-
ate” case to reconsider those negative Commerce Clause precedents, he invited 
future litigants to “find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine” them.66  
He then outlined the “powerful case to be made” for imposing tax collection 
duties on online retailers without a physical presence in the State.67  Using sta-
tistics to highlight the growth of online retail in the past fifty years and the 
estimated tax loss states have suffered under the Court’s negative Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, Kennedy provided the analytical structure for an argu-
ment to overrule those cases.68  He even suggested that his prior 1992 vote to 
uphold those precedents, as well as those of Justices Scalia and Thomas, were 
 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. at 1235. 
 60. See id. at 1236. 
 61. See id. at 1239. 
 62. 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 1129. 
 64. Id. at 1128. 
 65. Id. at 1134 (first citing Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 
U.S. 753 (1967); and then citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 
(1992)). 
 66. Id. at 1135. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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“based on stare decisis alone” and thus “underscore[d] the tenuous nature of 
that holding.”69  The implication was clear: if a future litigant were to raise a 
challenge to those negative Commerce Clause precedents on the grounds Ken-
nedy outlined, Kennedy believed he could convince a majority of his col-
leagues to adopt that reasoning and overrule those prior decisions.  Indeed, fu-
ture litigants, such as the State of South Dakota, seem keen to enact legislation 
that would provide a test case for Kennedy and his colleagues.70 
III.  ACCEPTABLE INVITED APPEALS – SOFT INVITATIONS 
Not all invited appeals are created equal.  For that reason, not all invited 
appeals are worthy of the same normative condemnation.  In this Part, I analyze 
the less-troubling soft invitations before returning to opinion-briefs in the fol-
lowing Part. 
On first impression, a Justice who enhances transparency by inviting cer-
tain legal challenges does no grievous harm.  As I have written elsewhere, 
transparency is vital to the Court’s work.71  A soft invitation for discussion of 
a certain topic, or exploration of one possible outcome in a case that no party 
has previously pressed, might give litigants advance notice of the questions that 
are the most intriguing to the Justices, even if they do not know how those 
questions might be resolved.  This would allow litigants to craft arguments that 
seem most likely to be persuasive and to cull research in fields that are most 
relevant to the Court’s internal debate. 
Soft invitations might also increase predictability of the Court, to the ex-
tent that the inviting Justice provides insight into her likely position in a future 
appeal.  The predictability gains from a soft invitation are likely to be minimal; 
such invitations are characterized by the open-minded approach taken by the 
inviting Justice, and thus they provide, at most, more tea leaves for practition-
ers to read regarding that Justice’s opinion on the issue.  Nonetheless, even an 
insubstantial increase in the predictability of Supreme Court litigation might 
be normatively laudable. 
Perhaps most importantly, soft invitations indicate high degrees of hon-
esty and humility in the authoring Justice.72  When the invitation is not an in-
dication that the Justice has already decided the future appeal and genuinely 
seeks to hear more discussion of the topic, there is much to be gained from 
answering the invitation.  Soft invitations will allow the organic development 
of theories on both sides of the issue, without any prejudgment by the decision-
 
 69. Id. at 1134. 
 70. Jennifer McLoughlin, “Quill” Case Challenging Nexus Law Heading to S.D. 
Court, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.bna.com/quill-case-challenging-
n57982070441/. 
 71. See, e.g., Michael Gentithes, Sunsets on Constitutionality & Supreme Court 
Efficiency, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 373 (2014). 
 72. For a discussion of the proper place that such judicial humility should have in 
adjudication, see Gentithes, Precedent, supra note 9. 
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maker.  The Justice is speaking in humility and honesty; she admits of being 
unconvinced by something but not yet of making up her mind or knowing the 
precise grounds upon which the Court should reach the proper decision.  Ulti-
mately, what she invites is a real, live controversy, one with unanswered ques-
tions and genuine positions taken by the opposing parties. 
The temptation for a Justice to issue such soft invitations in areas where 
she believes neither party has answered the most pressing questions is under-
standable given the dual role that judges in our adversarial system must play.  
Federal judges must both resolve immediate controversies before them and set 
broadly applicable precedent; when these goals conflict due to poor party 
presentation of issues, judges often wish to step in and address the arguments 
that the parties did not.73  In the interest of creating broadly applicable and 
reliable precedent, such soft invitations for additional argument on a topic seem 
justified.  Those invitations can be made openly, without deciding the issue in 
advance, and without blatantly advocating from the bench. 
These kinds of open-ended calls for argument might be particularly useful 
if offered in new and emerging areas of law, or where they avoid directly un-
dermining confidence in that which was already decided.  They must also be 
phrased generally and are most effective when joined by multiple Justices 
across the political spectrum who can affirm that the Court’s position is unde-
cided and in need of further refinement through the crucible of litigation.  That 
will signal to litigants not that the Court is sure to undermine a longstanding 
legal principle, but instead that it is in need of advice in a troubling legal area, 
if there are any parties interested in the topic and willing to provide argument 
on the issue. 
Soft invitations might also be normatively desirable as a release valve for 
the pressure Justices feel to issue a sua sponte ruling on a topic that was neither 
briefed nor argued in order to assure the accuracy and longevity of their prec-
edents.74  Inviting an appeal is an attractive alternative to deciding a case sua 
sponte without any argument from parties on either side.  So long as the invi-
tation is not so specific as to suggest that the Justice has already reached a 
conclusion on the issue, it serves our sense of procedural justice well to utilize 
soft invitations as such a release valve.75 
 
 73. Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 452 (2009). 
 74. See, e.g., Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts De-
prive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1255–56 
(2002) (collecting examples of the Court’s sua sponte rulings). 
 75. It should be noted that a Supreme Court Justice feeling this pressure has many 
options short of a full-throated invitation for a future appeal.  First, the Justice can 
simply note the issue and have the parties discuss it themselves in a reargument of the 
exact same case.  The Justice might also choose to rely upon invited amici to address 
the question on its mind: “It is not uncommon for the Court to introduce new questions; 
most commonly, it does so by asking the parties to brief and argue an additional ques-
tion to the one presented in the petition for certiorari, either when certiorari is granted 
or when ordering reargument in a case.”  Brian P. Goldman, Should the Supreme Court 
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IV.  OPINION-BRIEFS AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN AN 
ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM 
Opinion-briefs, as I have described them, may be far more pernicious than 
the soft invitations discussed previously.  These briefs can play a starring role 
in the decline of adversary procedure within the Supreme Court. 
To normatively evaluate opinion-briefs, one must first frame them in the 
context of Supreme Court Justices’ recent efforts to exercise ever-increasing 
control of the direction of litigation in their courtroom.  Justices have subtly 
begun to shape the arguments in the Supreme Court to the exclusion of the 
parties and their advocates, thereby imposing from the bench their own narra-
tives and analytical structures for cases.  Consider that, although the Court to-
day hears roughly seventy-five merits cases per Term,76 it has increased the 
median length of its decisions from 2000 words in the late 1950s, to over 8200 
by 2009.77  Writing fewer opinions per Term affords the Justices the oppor-
tunity to expound their own favored approaches to troubling legal problems, 
beyond those that are presented in the briefs themselves.  In a recent study of 
language overlap between the parties’ briefs and opinions in merits cases be-
tween 1946 and 2013, Adam Feldman has revealed “a clear decrease in the 
maximum values of language overlap per justice over time[,] potentially indi-
cating that the Court’s shrinking docket led to less reliance on the merits 
briefs.”78  Indeed, while thirteen Justices appointed before Justice Powell au-
thored an opinion with more than 40% of its language overlapping the briefs, 
none since Justice Powell has done so.79  In fact, only Justice Ginsburg of the 
presently sitting Justices has even approached the 30% barrier.80 
 
Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. 
L. REV. 907, 931–32 (2011) (footnote omotted). 
 76. See Sullivan & Canty, supra note 3, at 1006 n.5 (citing Stras, supra note 3, at 
950).  The Court’s output has remained at about that level.  See 2014 Term Opinions of 
the Court, supra note 3.  As recently as the 1980s, the Supreme Court’s caseload was 
generally regarded as overwhelming.  See, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 3, at 667 (“All of 
the justices now agree that they are overworked by deciding too many cases.”); see also 
Starr, supra note 3 at 1366–76. 
 77. See Sullivan & Canty, supra note 3, at 1007 n.11 (citing Black & Spriggs, 
supra note 3, at 630, 634–35). 
 78. Feldman, supra note 3, at 137. 
 79. Id. at 138. 
 80. As Feldman notes: 
 
Another way to look at the Justices comparatively is through their maximum 
overlap values.  This shows their potential willingness to incorporate a high 
level of language found in a merits brief.  The maximum value has decreased 
appreciably over time.  The last justice (by date of appointment) with a maxi-
mum value of 40% or greater in an individual case was Justice Powell.  Thirteen 
of the Justices have maximum values of 40% or greater including and prior to 
the appointment of Justice Powell.  Since Justice Powell’s appointment, the two 
highest overlap values in a case are 37% each for Justices Rehnquist and 
15
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At the same time that they have expanded the length and originality of 
their written opinions, Justices have changed their practices during oral argu-
ments in ways that reflect a restive bench eager to play just as prominent a role 
as the litigators in shaping their colleagues’ views and analytical approaches.81  
In a comparison of oral arguments in the 1958–60 and 2010–12 October Terms 
of the Supreme Court, Barry Sullivan and Megan Canty revealed the myriad of 
ways in which oral argument has become far more Justice-centric over the last 
half-century.82  The differences in oral argument between those eras 
 
include an increase in the average number of words spoken by the Jus-
tices in the later cases; a substantial increase in the percentage of words 
spoken by the Justices (compared with the percentage of words spoken 
by counsel) in the later cases; a higher average ratio of Justice state-
ments to questions in the later cases; an almost doubling of the average 
number of words the Justices spoke during each separate speaking turn; 
and a dramatic shortening of the longest opening and non-opening mon-
ologues by counsel in the later cases.83 
 
The Justices have increased by nearly a quarter the number of words they speak 
in the thirty minutes now typically allotted to each side at oral argument.84  
Further, “[m]easured purely by words, the current Justices are 2.280 times 
more talkative than their predecessors.”85  In the newer cases, Justices “also 
actively assisted some counsel, suggesting better arguments or helping counsel 
fill in gaps.”86 
 
O’Connor.  Justice Ginsburg is the last Justice appointed with an instance where 
the percentage of overlapping language between a brief and opinion exceeded 
30%.  The two Justices with the lowest maximum overlap values in a case are 
Justices Breyer and Kagan with values of 16% and 15% respectively. 
 
Id. at 139–40 (footnote omitted).  This is not to say that briefs have become wholly 
irrelevant in the modern era.  As Feldman notes, “B]riefs have remained a stable re-
source for the Justices and clerks and a resource they tend to use in fairly similar 
amounts.”  Id. at 149; see also Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1542 (noting that in interviews, 
88% of Supreme Court clerks acknowledge reading briefs filed by frequent litigators 
before the Court more closely). 
 81. Sullivan & Canty, supra note 3, at 1075 (“Justices may see oral argument as 
an opportunity to test their forensic skills against those of counsel.  In that game, the 
Justices not only call the balls and strikes, but also pitch, bat, and field.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1042. 
 84. Id. at 1043 (“Although the Court reduced by half the time allotted for oral 
argument (from a default rule of one hour to one-half hour to the side in each case), the 
Justices increased their total words per case by 23.7%.  At the same time, the average 
words spoken by counsel in each case decreased by 45.8%.” (footnote omitted)). 
 85. Id. at 1044. 
 86. Id. at 1061.  One prominent example of this kind of assistance can been seen 
in the Obamacare cases, where Justice Sotomayor pushed Solicitor General Donald 
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By exerting greater and greater control over the litigation process in their 
courtroom, Supreme Court Justices have changed the way legal doctrine 
evolves in our nation.  Though the Court sits at the pinnacle of an adversarial 
system,87 it is no longer a place where that system is actively practiced.  Justices 
typically offer detailed assistance for some litigants, providing support for their 
positions and even, in the case of opinion-briefs, thorough outlines of the ar-
guments that the supportive Justice believes will be most persuasive to her col-
leagues.88  At the same time, a Justice’s scorn for some litigants is hardly dis-
guised at all, finding expression in vitriolic terms at oral argument and in writ-
ten opinions.89 
This pattern presents a threat to an adversarial system of justice that is 
supported by a wide breadth of theoretical justifications.90  At the core of those 
justifications, is a faith that “a good process is the best way to achieve good 
and fair results.  If all of the procedural standards are met, everything should 
have been done correctly, and that affords the best possibility of getting to the 
truth, and ultimately to the best ‘correct’ answer.”91  This tenet runs throughout 
the American legal system.  The parties are the primary drivers of the law’s 
development in a bottom-up adversarial process at both the trial and appellate 
levels.  Party-controlled litigation, even on appeal, gives decision-makers “the 
benefit of developed arguments on both sides and lower court opinions 
squarely addressing the question.”92  Yet the Justices seem fixated on a more 
top-down model of lawmaking, where Justices announce broad policy pro-
nouncements with little party input.  Such a system would resemble Continen-
tal European justice systems more than our American tradition. 
 
Verilli to turn his argument towards the taxing power with specific, friendly questions.  
Id. at 1064. 
 87. As the Court has noted in the past, our adversarial system “rests on a principle 
of party presentation as many systems do not.  In many systems, the court does shape 
the controversy and can intrude issues on its own.  But in our adversarial system, we 
rely on counsel to do that kind of thing.”  Goldman, supra note 75, at 909 (quoting 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008) 
(No. 07-330)). 
 88. Sullivan & Canty, supra note 3, at 1061. 
 89. See id. at 1076. 
 90. Id. at 1077 (“How, for example, does one square the basic idea of legal repre-
sentation and the lawyer’s role in an adversarial system with a reality in which the 
Justices not only speak more than the lawyers, but also seem to do battle for one side 
or the other?”). 
 91. Cravens, supra note 1, at 269 (“A judge who interferes with the process by 
stepping out of the role of umpire and into the role of adversarial participant by becom-
ing involved in the fashioning of arguments may risk upsetting the process and produc-
ing bad results.”). 
 92. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 (1992). 
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A.  How Opinion-Briefs Undermine the Adversarial System 
Opinion-briefs exacerbate the trend against traditional American notions 
of procedural justice in Supreme Court practice.  When a Justice announces not 
only her interest in a particular legal topic unaddressed by the parties, but goes 
so far as to outline what she has predetermined to be the best reasoning to re-
solve that issue without ever reading briefs or hearing arguments, she under-
mines the sense that our judicial system offers the opportunity for all parties to 
be heard before a decision is rendered.93  At their most basic level, such intru-
sions into the usual adversary process allow Justices to “substitute[ their] judg-
ment[s] as to what issues should be in play for the parties’.  That represents an 
expansion of the judicial role from passive arbiter to more active inquisitor, 
and in constraining the parties’ freedom to shape their own case, it undermines 
their sense of procedural justice.”94 
Opinion-briefs also allow the Justices to thwart the ability of future liti-
gants to offer alternative theories or approaches to a troubling legal problem.  
Because an opinion-brief calls for future litigation with precisely outlined ar-
guments in great specificity, it does not allow any realistic opportunity for the 
parties to present flaws in the logic by which the Justice has already been con-
vinced.  After committing to such a detailed analysis in a signed opinion, that 
Justice will likely fall prey to several cognitive biases that will preclude her 
from any reconsideration or adjustment.  Confirmation bias will lead the Justice 
to discount any disconfirming evidence.95  Given the resources that the Justice 
and her clerks have already devoted to researching the issue and utilizing social 
science data available to support her conclusions, cognitive dissonance will 
make it especially difficult to change her view.96  And the phenomenon of “es-
calating commitment,” whereby an individual’s dedication to a pre-conceived 
decision only increases in the face of mounting disconfirming evidence, will 
 
 93. Cravens, supra note 1, at 251 (“A judge who interferes with the [adversarial] 
process by stepping out of the role of umpire and into the role of adversarial participant 
by becoming involved in the fashioning of arguments may risk upsetting the process 
and producing bad results.”); see also HAMPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 95. 
 94. Goldman, supra note 75, at 943–44; see also Miller, supra note 74, at 1260 
(“[S]ua sponte decisions trouble judges because due process interests are implicated 
when a court recasts the questions presented and decides a case on issues not discussed 
by the parties without remanding or providing an opportunity for briefing.”). 
 95. Confirmation bias “leads individuals to discount disconfirming evidence en-
countered after that individual has made up her mind.  In other words, confirmation 
bias causes people to tend to become close-minded and ignore new information once 
they have committed themselves to a particular position.”  Justin Pidot, Tie Votes in the 
Supreme Court, 101 MINN. L. REV. 245, 288 (2016) (footnote omitted). 
 96. Id. at 289 (“Cognitive dissonance can operate to make it more difficult for an 
individual to change her mind, particularly where resources have already been based 
on an earlier view.”). 
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likely tether the Justice to the words of her opinion-brief.97  The Justices them-
selves have even confirmed the effect that these cognitive biases can have upon 
them when they declare their positions in cases where the Court is deadlocked 
due to vacancies or recusals.98 
Given those biases in favor of the analysis spelled out in an opinion-brief, 
the parties will be hard-pressed to respond with anything but a parroted version 
of that analysis.  The parties will utilize the Justice’s analytical structure as the 
basis for claims that respond to the invitation.  Rather than formulating their 
own approaches, those advocates will be hemmed in by the pen strokes of the 
earlier opinion-brief. 
Justices might be tempted to violate norms of procedural justice more 
readily in an era of seemingly intractable political polarization.  Without judi-
cial action, many of the primary social problems facing the country could go 
unaddressed.  But that call to activism in times of political stasis is doubly mis-
guided.  First, it overestimates the ability of an individual Justice, and even the 
Court as a whole, to address relevant matters of social policy.99  Second, the 
structure of our government actually requires Justices to do less in an era of 
polarization: “[C]ourts and commentators have worried for generations about 
judicial review precisely because legislative supremacy is a fundamental prem-
ise of democratic self-government.”100  At a time when national faith in our 
government is at its ebb, judicial overreach might further undermine citizens’ 
respect for our constitutional system as a whole and the judicial branch specif-
ically.  In that context, opinion-briefs are particularly misguided. 
Opinion-briefs also raise a smaller procedural justice concern within the 
specific context of the Supreme Court Rules.  By limiting themselves only to 
those questions presented in the petition for certiorari, rather than offering de-
tailed invitations for future arguments, Justices serve an important notice func-
tion that is partially constitutive of procedural justice.  Supreme Court Rule 
14.1(a) addresses the importance of including all questions to be reviewed in 
the petition for certiorari: 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. For instance, Justice Brennan confirmed the effect of escalating commitment 
on the Justices, noting that the “practice of not expressing opinions upon an equal divi-
sion has the salutary force of preventing the identification of the Justices holding the 
differing views as to the issue, and this may well enable the next case presenting it to 
be approached with less commitment.”  Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264 
(1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 99. In Foreword: The Court’s Agenda – and the Nation’s, Frederick Schauer ar-
gues that only a miniscule proportion of the nation’s real policy agenda comes before 
the Supreme Court, or courts in general, in any given year, and thus threats that the 
Court might meaningfully legislate from the bench are overblown.  Frederick Schauer, 
Foreword: The Court’s Agenda – and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9–10 (2006). 
 100. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1204 (2006) (quoting William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitu-
tional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 844 (2001)). 
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[Doing so] provides the respondent with notice of the grounds upon 
which the petitioner is seeking certiorari, and enables the respondent to 
sharpen the arguments as to why certiorari should not be granted.  Were 
[Justices] routinely to consider questions beyond those raised in the pe-
tition, the respondent would lack any opportunity in advance of litiga-
tion on the merits to argue that such questions are not worthy of re-
view.101 
The opinion-brief’s author does just that.102  
B.  Constitutional Concerns with Opinion-Briefs 
Beyond their effect upon the adversarial system, opinion-briefs raise trou-
bling constitutional concerns.  They may be a slippery slope towards the ero-
sion of procedural due process rights guaranteed by our nation’s founding doc-
ument. 
When a Justice writes an opinion-brief, she is no longer directly consid-
ering the “case” or “controversy” before the Court, pursuant to its Article III 
ambit.103  An opinion-brief falls outside the resolution of any case or contro-
versy.  It is an open discussion of a hypothetical legal issue that might be raised 
by parties in a future case.  Justice Scalia has remarked that “[t]he premise of 
our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards 
 
 101. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535–36 (1992).  When the Court re-
stricts its ruling to those issues presented in the petition, it also efficiently selects ap-
propriate cases to be heard: 
 
Were we routinely to entertain questions not presented in the petition for certi-
orari, much of this efficiency would vanish, as parties who feared an inability 
to prevail on the question presented would be encouraged to fill their limited 
briefing space and argument time with discussion of issues other than the one 
on which certiorari was granted.  Rule 14.1(a) forces the parties to focus on the 
questions the Court has viewed as particularly important, thus enabling us to 
make efficient use of our resources. 
 
Id. at 536. 
 102. Of course, if a Justice is not satisfied with the issue presented in the petition 
for certiorari, she has other options to expand the field of argument, while still allowing 
both parties their say, be it through additional briefing or argument or through the par-
ticipation of invited amici.  Frost, supra note 73, at 501 (“If a judge realizes that there 
is an important legal argument that has been overlooked, or valuable precedent that has 
gone uncited, the judge does not act as advocate if she points out the missing infor-
mation and provides both parties with an opportunity to address the issues she has iden-
tified.”). 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Frost, supra note 73, at 486 (“Courts are not charged 
with enforcing the Constitution in the abstract, and may do so only in the context of 
specific cases and controversies.”). 
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of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions pre-
sented and argued by the parties before them.”104  Opinion-briefs risk upsetting 
that balance. 
It is understandable that a Justice would feel compelled to address issues 
she believes must be resolved to establish an accurate body of precedent.  It 
seems to conserve sparse judicial resources by immediately reaching the issues 
in a salient way, rather than waiting for parties to bring a case and make the 
most persuasive arguments.  But the Constitution requires Justices to play a 
less active role.  The Constitution “prioritizes constraints on power, which by 
design are inefficient.  [W]hile courts might be frustrated by biting their 
tongues until a litigant raises the theory they would prefer to use in resolving a 
question, constitutional structure would suggest they should accept that check 
on their authority.”105  Though Justices might be able to step in and suggest to 
parties that they have missed a particular argument and ought to consider it in 
a re-argument or other forum,106 the Constitution, at least facially, prohibits 
going further.107 
Justices who author a detailed opinion-brief commit a sin similar to Jus-
tices who sua sponte decide issues not presented by the parties.  Such sua 
sponte appeals contravene the Court’s own promise not to resolve questions 
that were not addressed by the litigants or lower courts.108  Commentators have 
decried the procedural unfairness when appellate courts resolve issues on ap-
peal without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard.109  Opinion-briefs 
 
 104. Goldman, supra note 75, at 940 n.180 (citing Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 
171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); see also Cravens, supra note 1, at 272 (“[C]ourts generally 
do not take it upon themselves to rearrange the lawsuit before them so that the plaintiffs 
will get the most effective relief available to them.  They do not fix those situations in 
which the plaintiff has, for example, sued the wrong party, sued under the wrong stat-
ute, or failed to request the most suitable form of relief.”). 
 105. Goldman, supra note 75, at 965. 
 106. Amanda Frost specifically suggests that such invitations should be willingly 
made by the Court.  Frost, supra note 73, at 508 (“[I]f judges do see an argument missed 
by the parties, they should be free to raise it on the condition that it is closely related to 
the legal question before them, and the parties are given a chance to voice their views 
on the issue.”).  Frost also accuses the Supreme Court of “retain[ing] seemingly stand-
ardless discretion to violate the norm of party presentation whenever it wishes to do 
so.” Id. at 465. 
 107. Goldman, supra note 75, at 965. 
 108. Miller, supra note 74, at 1255–56 (“[Although t]he Supreme Court often in-
sists it will not decide issues that have not been raised below[,] . . . some of the Supreme 
Court’s most famous opinions decided issues not presented by the briefs or addressed 
below.”).  According to Miller, prominent examples of such behavior by the Court in-
clude Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).  Id.  Others have similarly criticized the Court’s 
past instances of sua sponte discussion of an issue on appeal, specifically in Erie.  See, 
e.g., Frost, supra note 73, at 450–51. 
 109. Miller, supra note 74, at 1289–90. 
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are similarly troubling.  Though opinion-briefs do not offer the Court’s final 
word on the topic as do sua sponte appeals, they suggest that the authoring 
Justice herself has already formed her opinion based upon the specific analysis 
presented in the opinion and even suggest that the rest of the bench might be 
convinced if a future litigant has the temerity to so argue in a future case. 
Admittedly, though a Justice’s opinion-brief seems contrary to the spirit 
of a Supreme Court of limited jurisdiction, it might not actually be unconstitu-
tional.  Much of what the Court does in the opinions it issues is not strictly 
necessary to resolve the case or controversy before it, and this alone is not un-
constitutional.  Dicta abounds in most decisions, as do concurring and dissent-
ing opinions that explain alternate reasoning and outcomes that do not control 
the case or the future direction of the law explicitly.  And in any event, the 
Article III concerns raised by an opinion-brief are resolved once actively inter-
ested parties do bring a live case or controversy to the Court in response to the 
invitation.110  Nonetheless, opinion-briefs offer logic and reasoning that were 
unnecessary to resolve that active controversy, all without party input.  They 
presage an erosion of due process by allowing the Court, rather than parties, to 
contest key legal issues and drive the formation of new doctrine.  That slippery 
slope is at least undesirable, if not directly unconstitutional. 
V.  OPINION-BRIEFS AND THE PERCEPTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
When a Justice invites future argument or consideration of a new topic 
without maintaining an open mind, she casts herself as an advocate out to per-
suade her colleagues, not a neutral arbiter resolving a pressing legal question.  
The opinion-brief’s author thus invites not only a future appeal, but also several 
pernicious evils that could change the common perception of the Supreme 
Court.  Should opinion-briefs become too prevalent, they could wholly under-
mine the Court’s authority in our society. 
A.  Dissolving the Veil of Neutrality 
Opinion-briefs open the Court to accusations of politicized decision-mak-
ing, undermining the public’s belief in the Court’s neutrality.  When a Justice 
writes an opinion-brief, she appears to be nothing more than an interested party.  
Yet the perception of her neutrality is vital to her ability to definitively resolve 
controversies.111  As Owen Fiss has observed, it would be “foolish for the judge 
 
 110. Id. at 1257–58. 
 111. Put another way, “[t]he consequence of a court ‘becom[ing] an active inquirer’ 
is a failure ‘to convince society at large that the court system is trustworthy’ by virtue 
of ‘appear[ing] to be an advocate rather than a neutral arbiter.’”  Goldman, supra note 
75, at 947 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Stephan Landsman, The 
Decline of the Adversary System, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 487, 491 (1980)); see also Miller, 
supra note 74, at 1303 (“[P]arties and counsel may not perceive the court’s judgment 
as fair and legitimate unless they get their say before the court decides.”). 
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to assume a representational role” and undermine judicial impartiality.112  In 
allowing herself to appear politically motivated, the opinion-brief’s author 
makes an institutionally costly choice that “makes the Court seem less like 
what we consider to be a Court (executing the commands of others) and more 
like a policy maker (choosing what policy to make).”113  That undermines the 
perception that, at a minimum, the Court’s procedures allow both sides to a 
controversy the equal opportunity to be heard.114 
Opinion-briefs that successfully generate future appeals decided on the 
grounds proposed by the inviting Justice undermine the perception of the Court 
as a neutral body.  The inviting Justice appears to be little more than a law 
professor expounding upon pet issues from her lectern.  Rather than deciding 
the case before her, the opinion-brief’s author has made a superfluous and 
highly specific suggestion of the future direction of the law, a prophecy that 
she herself aims to fulfill in the future.  This is a far cry from a neutral arbiter 
lacking any policy agenda. 
The tarnish caused by opinion-briefs might not be repaired when two in-
terested parties litigate the issue later, in response to the Court’s invitation, 
even if neither claims to be directly responding to that judicial invitation.  The 
opinion-brief itself was so detailed as to suggest that, in the eyes of the author-
ing Justice, the outcome was a foregone conclusion.  That prejudgment of the 
future case is troubling.  As Lon Fuller noted, “[I]n the absence of an adversary 
presentation, there is a strong tendency by any deciding official to reach a con-
clusion at an early stage and to adhere to that conclusion in the face of conflict-
ing considerations later developed.”115  The public is likely to conclude that 
both the opinion-brief’s author and the Court as a whole prejudged the case in 
 
  It should be noted that at least some commentators have long decried the Jus-
tices’ lack of neutrality in light of the Court’s certiorari powers, which allow Justices 
to choose both the cases they will hear and the issues they will address within those 
cases.  See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five 
Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1718–26 (2000) (collecting 
commentaries decrying the Court’s agenda-setting powers). 
 112. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 
(1979). 
 113. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1384 
(1997).  In part for that reason, Lawrence Lessig concludes that, “All things being 
equal, a rule that reveals a political choice is a worse rule than a rule that does not.  
There is a pressure to select rules that don’t reveal this political choice.”  Id. 
 114. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 95 (“No one is expected to believe that [the 
Court’s] decisions are infallibly just in matters of substance; but everybody is expected 
to believe that at least its procedures are just because they conform to the basic principle 
governing adversary reasoning: that both sides should be equally heard.”). 
 115. Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34, 43 
(Harold J. Berman ed., 1961).  Again, others have suggested that accusations that the 
Court is overly political and prone to legislate from the bench are overblown in light of 
the small proportion of the nation’s policy agenda that comes before it.  See Schauer, 
supra note 99, 9–10. 
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favor of a preferred policy outcome, failing to act as a neutral arbiter of the 
case. 
B.  Eroding Stare Decisis 
One problem ancillary to the method that Justices employ in opinion-
briefs concerns their typical substance.  As the above discussion demonstrates, 
opinion-briefs often call for the disruption of settled precedent, perhaps without 
justification under the Court’s existing principles of stare decisis.116  Opinion-
briefs typically focus on the Court’s earlier work in the area of law at issue, 
without separately considering, as the Court’s own precedents about precedent 
require, previous decisions’ practical workability, reliance interests they have 
engendered, their status as a remnant of abandoned doctrine, or changes in facts 
so significant that the old precedents are robbed of significant application.117  
Opinion-briefs might even represent a Justice’s surreptitious effort to trim ex-
isting precedent in the pernicious spirit of what Professor Barry Friedman has 
coined “stealth overruling.”118  Opinion-briefs can thus be a form of subtraction 
by addition,119 an effort by the authoring Justice to subtly undermine existing 
doctrine until it can later be cast aside as “unworkable” or nothing more than a 
remnant of doctrine that has been abandoned.120 
Calls for doctrinal reversal in an opinion-brief are particularly troubling 
because the authoring Justice initiates them sua sponte.  The Court typically 
reverses its prior decisions “only with the greatest caution and reticence,” and 
doing so on a Justice’s “own invitation and without adversarial presentation is 
both unfair and unwise.”121  The opinion-brief’s author appears to have decided 
that reversal is appropriate without ever hearing from any interested litigant; 
 
 116. A full discussion of the consistency of the Court’s application of stare decisis 
is beyond the scope of this Article, though I have written extensively on that topic else-
where.  See Gentithes, In Defense, supra note 9; Gentithes, Precedent, supra note 9.  
For purposes of the present argument, it is worth noting that a common thread amongst 
opinion-briefs is the call to cull long-standing doctrine or even outright reverse previ-
ously decided cases.  Such calls for reversal plainly raise concerns for supporters of 
stare decisis in any form. 
 117. The Court’s most definitive statement on those circumstances is its decision in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 
(1992).  For a discussion on the appropriateness of the factors considered there, see 
Gentithes, In Defense, supra note 9, at 810. 
 118. Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention 
to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010). 
 119. See Gentithes, Precedent, supra note 9, at 884–89. 
 120. Id. at 852. 
 121. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2299 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“It deprives the parties and potential amici of the oppor-
tunity to brief and argue the question.  It deprives us of the benefit of argument that the 
parties, with concrete interests in the question, are surely better positioned than we to 
set forth.”). 
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where the invitation successfully creates a future appeal that does reverse doc-
trine or precedent, stare decisis will be eroded without due care and consider-
ation. 
By addressing the validity of a prior case sua sponte, the authoring Justice 
is on ground parallel to reaching an issue of constitutionality unnecessarily in 
violation of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.122  In both instances, the 
Justice is reaching sensitive issues needlessly, rather than resolving issues on 
narrower grounds that might be less deleterious to the public’s faith in the Court 
as an institution.123  This should resonate doubly with Justices considering an 
invitation to overrule precedent, which may both undermine the Court’s prior 
work and tread upon the work of elected branches.124 
C.  Misallocating Judicial Resources 
Opinion-briefs also misallocate scarce judicial resources and publicly in-
sert the Justices into policy debates better left to legislative bodies more insti-
tutionally competent to analyze them.  They require the Justice and his clerks 
to cull what research does exist and shape it into legal arguments, rather than 
simply calling the proverbial balls and strikes of litigation. 
First, opinion-briefs insert the authoring Justice into policy debates better 
left to the legislature, with the full weight of research capabilities, policy ex-
perimentation, and public debate Congress can bring to bear.  Supreme Court 
Justices simply lack the wherewithal to do the kind of widespread, inde-
pendently verifiable research that can be performed by other branches of gov-
ernment with bodies specifically designed for that policy-making function.125  
A Justice’s inability to perform that necessary social research to resolve vast 
 
 122. One scholar notes, “Avoidance is perhaps the preeminent canon of federal stat-
utory construction; its pedigree is so venerable that the Supreme Court invoked a ver-
sion of it even before Marbury v. Madison.”  Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 
15 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948 (1997). 
 123. The national perception of the Court is at the forefront of the primary justifi-
cation for the constitutional avoidance doctrine, “minimiz[ing] the instances of judicial 
review in which an unelected court invalidates the work product of the democratically 
accountable branches.”  Morrison, supra note 100, at 1204. 
 124. The Court does sometimes invite an argument on appeal specifically to serve 
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.  Frost, supra note 73, at 480 (“In the past, the 
Supreme Court has resolved cases on grounds outside the questions presented to avoid 
a constitutional issue . . . .”).  That seems to be appropriate, because inviting an appeal 
on those grounds is conservative, not activist, because it is a tool to avoid an unneces-
sarily expansive new reasoning.  In those cases, “issue creation can be a method by 
which courts constrain judicial power in response to litigants who would prefer to ex-
pand it.”  Id. at 481. 
 125. Goldman, supra note 75, at 952. 
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problems is one of the very reasons for Article III’s case or controversy re-
quirement.  Unelected judges simply are not able to perform the tasks necessary 
to make such vast policy choices.126 
Second, opinion-briefs can only be created if the authoring Justice at-
tempts to cull the research that does exist on the issue and shape it into legal 
arguments, which requires going beyond her role as legal umpire.  Supreme 
Court Justices are surely capable thinkers and persuasive writers, but allegedly, 
they have traded in their playing uniforms as litigators for the neutral robes in 
which they preside.  They have a few clerks and staff members, rather than 
hundreds of firm attorneys who might be hired by a litigant, at their disposal.  
Furthermore, their interest in a given case is far more limited than the nearly 
unbounded interest of a litigant who had been pursuing a particular result for 
years or even decades before the case reached the Supreme Court.  Even some 
authors of opinion-briefs acknowledge the potential pitfalls of relying solely 
upon the Justices and their clerks to perform the necessary research to reach an 
accurate conclusion.  Regarding some of the studies he cited in Glossip, Breyer 
noted that “this research and these figures are likely controversial.  Full briefing 
would allow us to scrutinize them with more care.”127  Breyer thus admits that 
he cannot do all of the research himself – neither he nor even the Court as a 
whole is institutionally competent to do so.128 
The Justice’s limited resources should be allocated to testing the mettle 
of parties’ finely tuned positions that have already culled any relevant social 
science data on the problem, rather than generating policy-based arguments of 
their own.  Even if a Justice is competent to digest this information, she is not 
competent to do the research herself, too – she must rely upon the parties to do 
a thorough job of that research and assembly. 
D.  Disregarding Judicial Humility 
One of the most desirable characteristics in adjudicators is a degree of 
humility, both in assessing new problems and in acknowledging that the work 
of their judicial forebears is worthy of significant deference.129  Opinion-briefs 
are a public indication of the authoring Justice’s disregard for that kind of hu-
mility.  They are instead symptomatic of an overtly hubristic Justice, one who 
apparently believes only she can formulate the best arguments to prevail on a 
 
 126. Id. at 951–52. 
 127. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2759 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see 
also id. at 2765 (noting the Court may not be institutionally competent, and this should 
be left to representative branches). 
 128. Breyer’s own shortcomings as a researcher opened his opinion to one of the 
harshest rebukes offered by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion.  Specifically, 
Scalia critiqued his reliance upon a study of the “egregiousness” of 205 capital crimes, 
noting that “[e]gregiousness is a moral judgment susceptible of few hard-and-fast rules” 
that could be distilled into such a study.  Id. at 2748 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 129. See Gentithes, Precedent, supra note 9. 
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particular issue.  Opinion-briefs beg the question: is the Justice so vain that she 
thinks only she can spot issues worthy of presentation? 
Opinion-briefs are made in such starkly specific terms as to invite not just 
an appeal, but a forgone conclusion as to that appeal’s outcome.  But that pre-
cludes genuine discussion and organic development of the parties’ positions 
through percolation in the lower courts.  Rather, the Justice seems to suggest 
that, without the aid of any litigation history, she has managed to divine the 
most accurate legal position.  She also implicitly asserts that she has convinced 
the majority of her colleagues of that position and can carry a majority of the 
Court along with her, if only a compliant attorney would raise the arguments 
she has detailed. 
The result is that the bench becomes a lectern for Justices to expound their 
views on pet issues, rather than the proverbial home plate from which to call 
balls and strikes.  The Justice is telling Americans that she believes jurispru-
dence in a given area must take a specific direction in the future, rather than 
allowing them to discover that truth either through the political process or 
through the crucible of contested litigation lacking a predetermined outcome.  
Making such a pronouncement is unbecoming of a Justice on our nation’s high-
est court.  The author of an opinion-brief indicates her lack of the humility 
necessary to effectively resolve the most highly contentious legal issues in the 
country. 
VI.  HOW TO RESPOND TO OPINION-BRIEFS SUCH AS GLOSSIP 
This Article’s normative analysis begs the question – if opinion-briefs are 
so undesirable, how should thoughtful litigators respond to their issuance?  
More specifically, how should death penalty abolitionists who have waited to 
spot cracks in the veneer of constitutionality for capital punishment respond to 
Justice Breyer’s opinion-brief in Glossip?  This Part offers some practical ad-
vice for lawyers facing that quandary. 
In general, there is reason to doubt the reliability of an opinion-brief’s 
prediction of the Court’s likely direction in a future case, despite the authoring 
Justice’s insinuations.  Though the argument is likely already won for the au-
thor, her colleagues, even those who sign on to the opinion-brief, are far from 
committed to the same reasoning or even outcome in future cases.  Indeed, if 
the authoring Justice had already convinced her colleagues of the propriety of 
her position, she could just as easily have issued a majority decision resolving 
the issue sua sponte rather than an invitation for future litigation.  The author-
ing Justice’s inability to issue such a decision must stem partially from the lack 
of shared conviction by her fellow Justices. 
The Justice authoring an opinion-brief may believe that her analysis will 
be persuasive to her colleagues when it comes from a litigant in a future case.  
But the sheer number of variables at play makes that assumption dubious, even 
if the authoring Justice expressly claims that she can drag her colleagues along 
with her.  To name but a few of these variables, Justices who signed on to the 
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opinion-brief could change their minds; new research could emerge that chal-
lenges the social science in the opinion brief; the parties to the subsequent case 
could unearth an argument that the authoring Justice and her clerks overlooked; 
or, as has been the case this Term, there may be changes to the bench itself.  
The latter scenario is in play in this Term’s litigation regarding the constitu-
tionality of public employee union dues.  As noted above, though Justice Alito 
was plainly hostile to such dues in Knox, leading parties to directly argue that 
Abood should be overruled in the subsequent Harris v. Quinn litigation, Alito 
was not able to cobble together a majority of the court willing to overturn 
Abood.130  Given the untimely passing of Justice Scalia, his opportunity may 
now be lost; this Term’s Freidrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n case, which 
again addressed the issue, resulted in a four-four tie amongst the Justices, leav-
ing Abood in place for the foreseeable future.131 
Thus, opinion-briefs seem exceptionally likely to foment confusion from 
litigants as to the Court’s most likely direction and whether the time and ex-
pense of further litigation is really justified.  Regarding Justice Breyer’s Glos-
sip dissent, David R. Dow noted that only two Justices signed the dissent, 
claiming that it “means so little in terms of the imminent demise of the death 
penalty that I wouldn’t spend any time on it.”132  In contrast, Professor Alan 
Dershowitz claimed that “Justice Breyer would not have written this dissent if 
he did not think this was a good time to bring cases to the attention of the 
court.”133  Others have agreed with Dershowitz, such as Richard Dieter of the 
Death Penalty Information Center, who noted after reading Glossip that “[t]he 
death penalty itself, I think, is in trouble.”134 
Even if an opinion-brief accurately predicted that a majority of the Jus-
tices would be persuaded by a future brief following its precise format, it would 
represent a troubling development for Supreme Court litigators.  Accurate 
opinion-briefs would be institutionally troubling for all of the reasons I have 
discussed above.  They would undermine American procedural justice and in-
crease the prevalence of top-down lawmaking by Justices-cum-policymakers.  
They would also alter the way the Court is perceived in fundamentally trou-
bling ways.  Lastly, litigators themselves should be wary of such opinion-briefs 
because they might foreclose their ability to creatively resolve cases and con-
troversies in other areas.  The Justices may become emboldened to prejudge 
 
 130. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2299 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 131. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.). 
 132. Liptak, Death Penalty Foes, supra note 6. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Adam B. Lerner, Justice Breyer’s Dissent: Death Penalty May Be Unconsti-
tutional, POLITICO (June 29, 2015, 1:09 PM), http://www.polit-
ico.com/story/2015/06/supreme-court-justice-stephen-breyer-death-penalty-may-be-
unconstitutional-119547 (last updated June 29, 2015, 5:35 PM).  Dieter bases that belief 
on suggestions in past decisions that Kennedy might someday side with Breyer on the 
issue and that Sotomayor and Kagan are likely sympathetic as well.  Id. 
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more and more of their docket, freezing out the interested litigator as the driv-
ing engine of doctrinal development. 
The opinion-brief’s author may even create a “penumbra” equivalent to 
the penumbra of constitutionality created by acknowledging a possible consti-
tutional infirmity.135  The opinion-brief casts unresolved doubt over a line of 
jurisprudence, creating the possibility that the lower courts will have to resolve 
the confusion perpetually.  Although the authoring Justice simultaneously calls 
for a resolution of that penumbra by asking for future argument on the topic, 
that resolution is not always immediately forthcoming, as seen in the Frie-
drichs litigation.136 
Perhaps most importantly, opinion-briefs threaten to undermine the 
groundswell of public opinion in favor of massive social changes.  They invent 
controversies that members of the Supreme Court bar are happy to litigate for 
the publicity but which might not have arisen on their own at the same pace.  If 
the issues highlighted by the authoring Justice were truly so compelling, the 
bar would certainly have raised them in due time and perhaps with better cases 
or more developed theories under their belts.  Justice Goldberg himself, an avid 
opponent of the death penalty, noted how changes in public opinion in the past 
had justified the Court in changing its position, and his hope was that “it may 
change again in the not too distant future.”137 
Thus, death penalty abolitionists responding to Glossip might be better 
served by not responding at all.  Accepting Breyer’s invitation has the potential 
to short-circuit the organic process of changing public opinion by calling for a 
premature resolution of the issue.  At a time when capital punishment is losing 
popularity state by state, and public opinion is shifting on the topic, patience 
may be the best course.  The groundswell of support must be massive before 
such a change can be dictated by the nine unelected members of the Supreme 
Court.  Furthermore, answering Justice Breyer’s opinion-brief risks cementing 
a dangerous trend amongst Justices of all political stripes.  Though death pen-
alty abolitionists may be only too happy to take on Breyer’s invitation, will 
they be equally enthusiastic if less-friendly Justices offer such invitations on 
other troubling questions?  For instance, as discussed earlier in this Article, 
there is a distinct possibility that in the near future Justices may follow through 
in overruling Abood on the constitutionality of public union dues, following a 
pattern similar to that seen regarding the constitutionality of efforts to reform 
campaign finance.  By responding to an opinion-brief on capital punishments, 
advocates would be legitimizing that tactic in numerous other areas of law with 
possibly damaging consequences.  The best route for all may be to foreclose 
opinion-briefs as a route for change on any topic, even those near and dear to 
a particular advocate’s heart. 
 
 135. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983). 
 136. See Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083. 
 137. Goldberg, supra note 12, at 5. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
An appeal invited in a detailed opinion-brief is a tempting elixir for Su-
preme Court litigants.  Opinion-briefs contain friendly language from the au-
thoring Justice in support of a particular position, and they are replete with 
language and analysis that can easily be cribbed for future certiorari petitions 
and substantive briefs.  But litigants and Justices alike should heed the poten-
tially disastrous normative repercussions of such invited appeals.  As this Ar-
ticle has argued, they can undermine our sense of procedural justice, misallo-
cate scarce judicial resources, dissolve the veil of neutrality that should enve-
lope the Supreme Court, inappropriately contravene stare decisis, and allow 
Justices to disregard any lingering sense of humility in favor of activist policy-
making from the bench.  They can also undermine the organic groundswell of 
support for a favorable policy and truncate the creative analytical efforts of 
Supreme Court advocates.  While open-ended soft invitations for future argu-
ment on a topic yet to be decided may be permissible, or even desirable, de-
tailed opinion-briefs that spell out the analysis of which the authoring Justice 
has already become convinced are dangerous material.  Both Justices and liti-
gants should seek to avoid this whenever possible. 
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